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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

IIO\\' AitD B. ERIC KSEX,
Plain tiff -Appellant

J

Case No.
9973

vs.

HOBER'I' L. POULSEN,
Defendant-Respondent.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

STATE~IENT

OF l{IND OF CASE

This is an action wherein plaintiff has ~sked for
damages due to the sale of a P.O.A. stallion named
Applejack, alleging that defendant warranted said
stallion to be fit and capable of producing offspring
by reason of past performance; alleging that the stallion was sterile; that as a result of sterility certain
expenses were incurred. In his prayer he prayed for
rescission as well as damages. Defendant answers and
alleges that said stallion was young and of tender age;
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that two mares had been bred prior to the time of sale
and were with foal; that if the stallion became sterile
it was due to negligence and mismanagement of the
plaintiff, or sickness or disease contracted on the premises of the plaintiff; also that if plaintiff suffered auy
damages it was the result of the plaintiff's contributory
negligence that was a proxiinate cause of the dan1age,
if any, sustained by him.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Case was tried by the court sitting without a jury,
and the court concluded that sufficient evidence had
not been presented by the plaintiff, on which the court
could predicate a finding concerning the alleged unfitness of Applejack to breed at the time of sale, and
as a result thereof dismissed plaintiff's complaint.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant, on this appeal, seeks to sustain the
judgment in the lower court.

STATEl\'IENT OF FACTS
The defendant, Robert L. Poulsen, is a doctor
of veterinary science and resides in Tremonton, Utah.
He met the plaintiff for the first time on the highway
south of Pocatello, Idaho (Rec. 10, 188, 210}. Prior
to said meeting and on the same day, Mr. and Mrs.
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J•:rickson, with a party by the nan1e of Jack ~lerenes,
hnd been to the premises of Dr. Poulsen in his absence
and had seen the stallion Applejack. They had even
lend hi1n out of his box-stall and examined him quite
carefully (Rec. 9, 186, 197). When they 1net Dr. Poulsen on the road south of Pocatello, they asked him if
the horse was for sale. He advised them that he was and
that the asking price was $I500.00. They were there
about I.> to 20 minutes and Erickson said if he could
raise the money he would let him know (Rec. 2IO).
Dr. Poulsen ( Rec. 2IO) testified that he did not recall
anything said aboll:t what Mr. Erickson was going to
do with the stallion, but just that he was interested in
a P.O.A. stallion and he assumed he was buying him
t'or a stallion, because he didn't say.
The following Monday morning (Rec. 2II) Mr.
~Ierenes called Dr. Poulsen and it was agreed that
:\lerenes and ~Ir. Erickson would leave from Idaho
Falls and driYe toward Tremonton and Dr. Poulsen
would load the stud at Tremonton, and drive toward
Idaho Falls and they would exchange the horse where
they met. They met at 1\!IcCammon, Idaho. (Rec. 2II).
~Ir. Erickson had a Chevrolet truck with a horse van
on it. Dr. Poulsen had a Miley six pony trailer and
the young stallion in the trailer. The record is conflicting as to just what was said at the time the stallion
was paid for and placed in the possession of the plaintiff, )lr. Erickson claiming (Rec. II):
··A.. I asked hin1 again about his useability, and

he assured n1e again that if I didn't use him
5
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over two or three times a week, he'd be all
allright, and that he'd had his shots for distemper.''
Mr. Merenes (Rec. 190) said what happened was as
follows:
"A. Well, he asked him, he said, "How many
mares are you going to breed with him?"
And he said, "about thirty." Well, the doctor says, "Do you realize the pony won't be
two until this fall? He's a young pony ... "
and reported that Erickson said:
"A. Well, he said he'd take good care of him,
breed what he could and he had a Shetland
pony to help fill out what he wouldn't
breed."
He was asked if anything was said about the frequency
of breeding and Mr. Merenes said: "I didn't hear anything like that." He said he was there all the time. Dr.
Poulsen (Rec. 212) gave his version of the conversation
and said:
" . . . I'm not certain of the exact words, but
he said about this time, "Well, this little horse
has sure got his work cut out for him. I've got
thirty mares to breed to him." And I immediately says, "Well, you can't breed thirty mares
to this horse. He won't be two until in the fall."
MR. GEORGE D. PRESTON: Won't be
what?
A. Two until fall. And he said, "Oh, I'll be
careful. I'll space them out and feed him and
take good care of hi1n." And I says, "'Veil, you
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want to retnetnber he's just a colt, just a young
colt. I have bred two Inares to him and apparently they've settled." And I says, "I know that
the horse has got a lot of breeding ability right
now, because he tnade a good cover on these
mares," and I said, "I'd be awful careful breeding him to that tnany mares."
He was asked if there was any conversation about
breeding the horse twice a week and he said there was
none. It was cold at the time and all three people
were in the Poulsen pony trailer where they held their
conversation for the purpose of getting out of the cold.
The stallion was then transferred from the six pony
trailer to the truck that Merenes and Mr. Erickson
were in and driven to Idaho Falls (Rec. 191) and on
'Yednesday he was taken to Montana (Rec. 12). It is
'275 miles from Idaho Falls to the residence ef tli8 FQ~i
~of the Ericksons in Montana (Rec. 22). Mrs.
Erickson, however, (Rec. 51) said that they stayed
at Archer, near Rexburg, Idaho, and stayed over night
awl that .Archer to Hamilton, where the Ericksons'
residence is, is 250 miles and that the total distance
ft·om Tremonton was 400 miles ( Rec. 40) . The stallion,
while in the hands of Dr. Poulsen, had been bred to
two different mares. One was a buckskin mare (Rec.
'214) named Cheyenne. She had, from a previous breeding, foaled on the 29th day of April, 1961. She was
thereafter and within nine days bred to Applejack.
)lr. Val Dee Leavit was present with Dr. Poulsen
at the time of the breeding (Rec. 214, 173, 174). From
this breeding the tnare had a colt in the following spring

7
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(Rec. 174, 175) and this colt was examined by both
Dr. Poulsen and Mr. Leavitt. They caught the colt
and threw it down to determine its markings. It was
found to be mottled under the tail and around the lips
and had definite P.O.A. characteristics. The other
mare (Rec. 215) was a little bay mare that Dr. Poulsen
had bought at a Prescott sale in Idaho, and she was
bred on the 12th day of May near the end of her heat
period. The mare was taken to the Pamona Horse sale
in California and sold on the 17th day of June. Prior
to her sale she was moved into a barn (Rec. 217) and
there she was clipped and put on a full grain ration. She
was watched carefully to determine whether or not she
had settled. She was cross tied in front of other stallions
in box stalls and she did not come in heat. There was
sufficient time elapsed between the breeding and the
day of sale, so that she would have come in heat if she
had not been settled. Mares vary from 18 to 21 days
(R. 218) between their heat periods. The whereabouts
of this mare became unknown so that the defendant
could not deter1nine whether or not she had a P.O.A.
colt.
Up to the time of delivery in McCammon, Idaho,
on the 29th day of l\1ay, the horse had proved his breeding ability by breeding two mares. He was exceptionally young, being approximately 21 1nonths of age,
and would not reach his second year birthday until September 10, 1959. (Ex. 2). It had had the best of care
and was kept in a separate box-stall. where the Ericksons had taken him out to look at hin1. (Rec. 187).
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\\'hat the hors<.: was subjected to in the hands of
the buyer can only be surmised by the history of what
happened to the horse while in their hands. He first
becnme atl'licted with ring-worn1 (Rec. -:t5), and Erickson also said :
"A. \Veil, 1 noticed he wasn't as lively as other
studs. l-Ie didn't run and buck and kick like
he should have done.
Q. \Vha t were his characteristics?

A. l-Ie was a little stiff-legged, and that's the
way he acted." ( Rec. 15) .
In the month of October, 1961, (Rec. 16) he developed
distemper. On Decen1ber 12, 1961, Mr. Erickson took
hint to the veterinary and the veterinary discovered he
was blind (Rec. 78); that he would stand with his head
down like an ani1nal suggesting some form of brain
damage; the horse died that day or the day following
and a post-morte1n examination was made (Rec. 79)
and they found absces~es within the brain which Dr.
J a1nes K. Jackson from lVIontana (Rec. 79) called
streptococci equi infection, as a result of the distemper.
In regard to the use 1nade of this stallion, there
was considerable question of whether abuse had taken
place there. The total trip was 400 miles in length from
Tremonton (Rec. 40) . The stallion was unloaded and
reloaded frmn one vehicle to another and kept overnight. They put hun on a breeding program the day
after he arrived ( Rec. 13) . They claimed he completely
wilted durii1g an act of breeding ( Rec. 13, 14) and had

9

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to be helped down and said they had never seen anything like that. Yet four veterinary doctors, being the
plaintiff's veterinary from Montana and two veterinary
doctors called in by the defendant as well as the defendant himself, said that this was very normal in a
young stallion. This young stallion was bred six times
in three weeks (Rec. 14) and none of the mares became
with foal. On the 26th day of June ( Rec. 68) Dr.
James W. Jackson was called in to make an examination and while there bred him to two different mares,
one by use of a comdomn ( Rec. 70) and one without
within a half hour interval. He clailned that the quantity
of ejaculate was small and in response to his counsel's
question ( Rec. 71) :
"Q. Was the stallion Applejack capable of producing offspring the day you made the test?

A. On the basis of the test, no. But the fact that
he was producing sperm could neither justify a diagnosis of infertility or fertility."
He advised his client, the plaintiff, that you could not
base a diagnosis or an interpretation on one test (Rec.
73) . He prescribed rest and one tablespoon per day of
Hi-Amine, an iodize protein (Rec. 74). He admitted
it was a touchy drug ( Rec. 75) . He was given one
tablespoon full per day of this drug from the 27th day
of June to the 15th day of August (R. 31). The othel
veterinarians all said the giving of the Hi-Amine drug
for this period of time could, in their opinion, be very
detrilnental to the horse's breeding ability (Rec. 126,
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t:.:7, 1.-Jti, 157 and :.!:.!;)) aw.ln1ight injure or destroy it,
nud that they did not recmmnend it for a stallion.

To give the stallion rest he was turned into a pastun-. but il was found that this pasture contained two
horse colts and two filly colts, all being yearlings (Rec.
tiH) ... \11 of the veterinarians, both for plaintiff and
defendant. admitted that filly colts of this age could
come in heat and that there could be additional breeding
that could be detritnental to this young stallion. (Rec.
98, 1t>J. 228, 229).

All of the veterinarians agreed that many factors
nffect the production of sperm from day to day and
two said that after the hauling of a young stallion for
a distance of 400 miles under the conditions shown,
that he should have had three weeks to a month rest
before any breeding program (Rec. 91, 136, 137, 141,
15:!, 153, 224). All of the veterinarians agreed that all
tests and even the pathological report of the autopsy
made, after death, showed that the horse was producing
spertn and he could not be classed as sterile at any time
(Rec. 90, 108, 121, 122, 155, 156, 220). The opinion
testilnony of some of the veterinarians that the fact
that the horse had been bred on the premises of the
defendant and had produced a live foal was the best
proof of his breeding ability and that he was fertile at
the time of sale (Rec. 92, 131, 222).
J.,ron1 this kind of evidence, the court had to find:
"15. That while the court has found that
Applejack was able to cover two mares and im-

11
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pregnate one prior to the sale,and that after said
animal was transported from Tremonton, Utah,
to Hamilton, Montana, he was then unable to
impregnate plaintiff's mares, this court is unable, from the evidence, to make any finding as
to whether said animal was in fact infertile at the
time of the sale."
And had to conclude:
"5. That sufficient evidence has not been presented by the plaintiff on which the court could
predicate a finding concerning the alleged unfitness of Applejack to breed as of the time of
sale." (Rec. 300).

As a consequence, the court entered a judg1nent that
plaintiff had no cause of acton against the defendant.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW NO. 5 AS FOUND
IN THE AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
DATED 16TH DAY OF JULY, 1963, Rec. 300).
The plaintiff had the burden of proof and from
that proof the court had to find and conclude, as set
out in his conclusion of law No. 5, as follows:
"5. That sufficient evidence has not been presented by the plaintiff on which the court could
predicate a finding concerning the alleged unfitness of Applejack to breed as of the time of
sale."
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The court. at that tin1c, iwll watched the \vitnesses,
had had :111 opportunity to observe signalling, (Rec.
it! and had had an opportunity to see the inconsistencies of smne of the docu1nents that were handed in as
exhibits. For instance, defendant's exhibit No. 26,
which is a letter OYer the signature of plaintiff's expert
witness J. 'V. Jackson, a \'eterinary of the Veterinary
Clinic of Hun1ilton, ~fontana, dated January lOth,
I 962. and addressed as follows: "'ro Whom It May
Concern." The first paragraph of this exhibit says:
"On J nne 26, 1961, I was called out to examine a P.O.A. Stud for Howard Erickson. He
stated that 1nares repeatedly returned to estrus
after breeding.'' (Italics added. )
Xow. this state1nent, when analyzed and when it is
considered that it was made up after the stallion's
death. leads one to believe that it was an attempt to
obtain an advantage under a false premise. For instanee, the heat period of estrus, as referred to by the
doctor in his letter, is 18 to 21 days (Rec. 218), and they
stay in this heat period for several days (Rec. 215).
The plaintiff took the stallion to Idaho Falls over
Decoration Day (Rec. 12) and left on Wednesday
of said week and claims the first attempt to breed was
the day after he got home (Rec. 13). This would put
the first 1nare to be bred approxi1nately the first day
of June. 'Y e have nothing in the record to show
whether she was bred at the beginning of her heat period
or at the end of it, but she would not come in heat
again for 18 to 21 days after the end of the heat period.
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The next mare was bred the following Sunday and the
same problem arises. The doctor, in his letter, says that
the mares repeatedly returned to estrus, which would
have to be more than once, which is physically impossible
to happen. Then again, other exhibits were offered in
with inconsistencies. Plaintiff's exhibits 4 to 10 inclusive, being breeding certificates, show $50.00 paid for
the service fee and the plaintiff claimed he paid the
$350.00 for the seven breeding certificates (Rec. 19).
Again exhibits II to I6 show a $50.00 breed fee each
and plaintiff alleges he paid the said $50.00 each (Rec.
20) . On voir dire examination ( Rec. 22) he admitted
he gave for the breeding certificates shown as Exhibits
II to I6, two mares and a bridle. These two mares were
sold shortly after, one being sold for $65.00 and the
other for $72.50 (Rec. I95). The stallion Little Earthquake actually belonged to the defendant Dr. Poulsen,
and he was taken there as a courtesty at the request of
Dr. Poulsen by Mr. Merenes (Rec. I93) and the consideration given being the two mares and a bridle was
for th expense of the trip (Rec. I99) going and the
picking of the stalleion again at a later date. In regard
to the exhibits 4 to IO, it developed on cross-examination that there had been no money passed on that either
(Rec. 34) but it was just a trade and that these certificates were obtained and 1nade up when they were
getting ready to prepare for trial, and after the stallion's death.
Plaintiff, in his brief on page 4, quotes certain parts
from different paragraphs out of the Findings and
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leaves other parts out lu suit his convenience, which
creates a dili'erent itnpression than the actual findings
if taken as a whole. :For instance, in paragraph 10, he
leaves off the last phrase:
" ... by reason of past perforinance."
which ties back to Finding of Fact No. 2, which has
1·eference to the breeding while in the hands of the
defendant, having produced a live colt. Finding No.
11 of the atnendments ties again back to paragraph 2.
The amended ~.,inding No. 12, which was included at
the instance of the plaintiff, speaks of representation,
that is, representation of past performance, as spoken
of in Findings No. 10 and 2, the knowledge and integrity spoken of would again refer to past performance, that is, that the horse had been bred to two mares
and both 1nares appeared to be settled and it later
proved that one gave birth to a live foal and the other
was sold and lost track of, and it cannot be determined
whether or not she gave birth to a live colt. The record
is clear and the court so found that a foal was born
from the breeding while in the hands of the defendant.
The live foal is living proof of the fitness of the stallion
while in the hands of the defendant and there is nothing
in the record to show that this condition ever changed
until the stallion got in the hands of the plaintiff, when
it was so unwisely handled. Again, we find that the
plaintiff in his brief, on page 4, leaves out a pertinent
part in quoting from paragraph 13 from the findings
to-wit:

15
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" ... and that after said animal was transported from Tremonton, Utah, to Ha1nilton,
Montana, he was then unable to impregnate
plaintiff's mares, this court is unable, from the
evidence, or to make any finding as to whether
said ani1nal was in fact infertile at the time of
sale."
It must be re1nembered that each and all of the
expert witnesses who testified, and there were four,
claimed that all of the evidence showed the young stallion, in each and all of the tests and the post-1nortem
examination, revealed that he was, in fact, producing
sperm in each and every occasion and that he could
not be classed as sterile at any time. Each and all of the
experts agree that the stress, strain, nervous excite1nent,
over breeding, improper diet, transportation, sickness,
infection and many other things either in the mare or
the stallion, could affect the ability to have the mare
become impregnated eYen with live sperm present.
The Prestons, in their brief quote from the case
of Eden vs. Vloed1nan, 1-i P2d 930. From an examination of this case it appears that bangs disease was
reported in the cows. It also appears that the court apparently was satified that the bangs disease was present
at the time of sale, though not fully developed. This
is contrary to any findings in our case. They also quote
the case of Petersen vs. Dreher, 194 NW 53, which
raised the question of whether an express warranty
excluded any i1nplied warranty. In this action, the trial
court granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict. When it was heard before the Supre1ne Court
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they held that the plaintiff had offered evidence that
the sow was sterile at the time of sale and the court
held that the case should have been submitted to a
jury for breach of implied warranty, so that the jury
might determine whether or not the defect existed at
the time of sale. This case could not apply because the
l'ourt. in our case, found that there was not sufficient
evidence to warrant a finding that the defect did exist
at the time of sale.

They quote the case of Studebaker Bros vs. Anderson, 50 Utah 319, 67 P. 663, involving an automobile which, to the writer of this brief, should not be
applicable for two reasons. One, that anything that is
alive and under the custody and control of man, has,
its very existence, subject to the treatment that it receives from the hand of man from day to day. The other
reason is that the whole reasoning of the court, in this
case, indicated that the defect did apparently exist at
the time of sale, which is contrary to the findings in
our case.
Their quotation from 46 Am. Jur., page 573, refers to an exa1nination i1nmediately after sale, while
the first examination that we had in this case was nearly
a month later, by third parties.
The l\Iousel vs. Widker case, 69 NW 2d 783, N.D.,
was a case where, in the trial in the District Court, the
seller sued for the balance due on the purchase price.
Judgment was rendered for seller. Thereafter, on motion. a new trial was granted and there was an appeal
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from the order granting a new trial. The Supreme
Court held that the instruction on express and i1nplied
warranties and contracts were incomplete, misleading
and amounted to misdirection, and that the court did
not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial. This
was not a decision on its merits but upon the question of
whether or not the jury had been properly instructed
and the Supreme Court said it was the court's duty if
there had been evidence of either express or implied
warranty or both, to properly instruct upon it. The
court had instructed on both theories. The court said,
page 786, lefthand column:
"In the instant case no request was made by
the defendant for 1nore cmnplete instructions on
implied warranty. Under the rule stated in the
above cases he is barred from raising any objections to the insufficiency of the charge on implied warranty. However, he is not barred on his
motion for a new trial from claiming as error
that the instructions the court gave on implied
warranty amounted to misdirection. That he has
a right to do even though he failed to ask for
more complete instructions and is barred from
objecting on the grounds of non-direction not
amounting to misdirection.''
The motion for a new trial was sustained.
In viewing the citations given by appellant in 53
ALR 2d 884, it shows on any of the cases cited that are
applicable that the implied warranty covered a defect
that was in existence at tin1e of sale. \V e also have this
sa1ne doctrine, that the defect must exist at the time of
sale, found in 46 Am. J ur., page 571.
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POINT II
TI-lE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
:\lAKING CONCLUSION O.F' LAW NO.4, AND
TilE JUDGMENT.
The Findings of F., act taken collectively show ( Rec.
288, 289, 299, and 300) : The purchase; sale for breeding in keeping with age of 21 months; representing
breeding to two mares and a live foal being born; in
hands ot' plaintiff, breeding by plaintiff, but no foal;
diseuse on plaintiff's premises; tests showing live and
dead sperm; death from abscesses caused by distemper
on plaintiff's premises; post-mortem showing at death
production of active spermatozoa; no attempt to rescind
sale prior to death of stallion; many factors relating to
either mare or stallion such as age, physical condition
of one or both contribute to failure of mares to get
with foal; stallion represented fit and capable by reason
of past perforznance; defendant kne'¥ stallion purchased for breeding and plaintiff relief on representations of defendant, but after transportation was incapable of begetting offspring; some expenses incurred
by plaintiff in veterinary and feeding; prior to sale bred
twice, proof of one impregnation, but after transportation, unable to impregnate; that the court is unable
from evidence to find animal infertile at time of sale.
From these findings ( Rec. 290) the conclusion No.
4, which is as follows:
"4. That plaintiff has no cause of action against

defendant."
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and also conclusion No.

5 ( Rec.

300) :

"5. That sufficient evidence has not been presented by the plaintiff on which the court could
predicate a finding concering the alleged unfitness of Applejack to breed as of the time of
sale."

The Judgment (Rec. 291) merely carried these Findings and Conclusions into effect. lVe believe that the
Findings and Conclusions as well as the J udg1nent are
proper and are in keeping with the law and adjudicated
cases.
Appellant states that he pleads for damages (Rec.
263) but prays for two remedies (Rec. 264)-judgment for damages in one paragraph - rescission and
damages in another pargaraph and equitable relief in
a third paragraph, and complains because defendant
did not demand an election of remedies. It must be
remembered at the tilne of the commencement of the
action the stallion was dead and could not be returned
to the seller so that the rescission as provided for in subparagraph (d) of Section 60-5-7 U.C.A., could not
apply. The appellant evidently recognized this for he
set out in his proposed findings and conclusions ( Rec.
296) paragraph 9:
" ... at no tin1e prior to the death of said stallion on the 13th day of Decembe1·, 1961, or prior
to the 14th day of December, 1962, tl;le date when
the said complaint was filed, did the plaintifl
attempt to rescind said sale or return the stallion
in the condition it was at the time of sale."
And in his proposed conclusions ( Rec. 297) he says:
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"4. Thnt plaintiff has suffered damages in the
amount of' $1,450 by reason of' the breach of
warranty and has elected to sue for breach of
warranty and the difference between the amount
paid for the stallion and its actual value.

5. That plaintiff cannot rescind the contract
of sale because of his delay in attempting rescission and further that plaintiff cannot return the
stallion in substantially the same condition as it
was when received."

The plaintiff has prayed for damages. Under the
statute he cannot rescind because he cannot return the
subject matter of the sale. The defendant defended
and said the animal, when delivered, was as represented,
andit' any change took place while in plaintiff's hands
it was because of plaintiff's abuse and mishandling.
Then if the court, after hearing all of the evidence,
finds and concludes that sufficient evidence had not
been presented by the plaintiff on which the court could
predicate a finding concerning the alleged unfitness of
Applejack to breed as of the time of sale, he then
has no cause of action.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
)lAKING CONCLUSION OF LAW NO. 3.
This conclusion of Law No. 3 (Rec. 289) reads as
follows:
"3. That the death of Applejack was not
caused in any way by reason of the claim of
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Applejack's incapability to impregnate plaintiff's mares."
Evidently the plaintiff has reference to conclusions of
law No. 2, not 3, at least it appears so from his argument. Let us take the exact testimony of Mrs. Erickson (Rec. 54, line 14):
"A. Well, I asked if it was Dr. Poulsen and
he said yes. So I told him about the tests that
were made on the horse and that. Then he asked
us if we would wait a while and give the horse
a chance to mature, since he was just a young
horse, which we agreed to do."
Dr. Poulsen's testimony on this (Rec. 218, line 21) :
"A. She told me that the horse wasn't settling
her mares and that they were real disappointed in the horse, that he was not settling
the mares. I again told her that he was quite
young to be carrying on much of a breeding program, and I asked her, as I remember I asked her how many she'd bred, and
I don't recall the nu1nber. She told me she'd
bred a few. I don't remember exactly how
many. But I told her that maybe with time
the horse would get a little more n1aturity,
he'd probably breed.
Q. Was there anything said at that time about
wanting to bring hi1n back?
A. No, sir."
From the record of the conversation does it meet the
requirements of Section 60-5-7 subparagraph (d)
U.C.A., which reads as follows:
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"60-5-7. Re1nedics for breach of warranty( 1) 'Vherc there is a breach of warranty by the

seller. the buyer may, at his election; (a) Accept or keep the goods and set up against the
seller the breach of warranty by way of recoupment in diminution or extinction of the price;
(b) Accept or keep the goods and maintain an
action against the seller for damages for the
breach of warranty;
(c) Refuse to accept the goods, if the property
therein has not passed, and maintain an action
against the seller for damages for the breach of
warranty; or,
(d) Rescind the contract to sell or the sale, and
refuse to receive the goods, or, if the goods have
already been received, return them or offer to
return the1n to the seller and recover the price
or any part thereof which has been paid."
There certainly was no stallion returned or offered
to be returned, as provided in sub-paragraph (d) of
paragraph 1 of Section 60-5-7, U.,C.A., so that subparagraph 5 of Section 60-5-7, U.C.A., could not apply
nor any of the reasoning set out by appellant.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT WAS THE TRIER
OF THE FACTS AND TRIAL COURT'S FINDIXGS OF FACT 'VILL NOT BE DISTURBED
AS LOXG AS THEY ARE SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OR UNLESS
THERE IS NO REASONABLE BASIS IN
EVIDENCE.
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The most recent case of Lowe vs. Rosenlof et al.,
12 Utah 2d 190, 364 P2d 418, on page 419, right column
on Pacific Reporter, says:
" ( 1) This court has stated on numerous occasions that findings of fact made by the trial court
will not be disturbed so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the
findings of the lower court must be affirmed unless there was no reasonable basis in the evidence
on which the court could fairly and rationally
have thought the requisite proof was met."
The same doctrine is found in Child vs. Child, 8 Utah 2d
261, 332 P2d 981, and in De Vas v. N able, 13 Utah 2d
133, 369 P2d 290.

CONCLUSION
The young stallion, before sale or after, was never
sterile. His breeding ability could increase or decrease
from time to time, according to favorable or unfavorable handling. His untimely death brought about on
account of disease, contracted on the premises of the
plaintiff which caused abscesses in the brain, destroyed
a very desirable animal. The evidence adduced by the
four veterinarians showed how important care and
handling can be in any breeding program, particularly
of young animals. Also, it showed how the ability of a
young, immature animal to breed can change or alter
from tin1e to time, according to conditions he might
be subjected to.
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\ \' e believe the horse was abused and improperly
bred without consideration of his age. We believe the
plaintiff gave no consideration to the effect of the hauling. the weather, the infection contracted on plaintiff's
premises, his stiff-leggedness, that developed at plaintiff's place indicating unknown conditions that he might
have been subjected to. We do not believe he should
have been turned into pastures with fillies that might
come in heat and cause excessive breeding and stress,
or tim t he should have been fed a touchy drug for prolonged periods of time. We do not believe that the defendant must guarantee against such treatment. When
we consider this kind of treatment with the fact that
the stallion in the hands of the defendant bred two
mares and evidently settled both, but absolute proof
of impregnation of one was made, then we would have
to conclude that at the time of delivery he was as represented. We believe that the court was correct in finding and granting a judgment of no cause of action.
Respectfully submitted,
Walter G. Mann
Reed W. Hadfield, of the firm of
Mann and Hadfield
Brigham City, Utah
Attorneys for Defendant
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